Submission

Below is the first draft of my submission on Barbara Stewart's Electoral (Reduction in Number of Members of Parliament) Amendment Bill. It is based primarily on arguments here and here. While submissions haven't actually opened yet (the Justice and Electoral Committee hasn't set a date), I thought I'd get in early and refine my thoughts a bit.

1. I oppose the Electoral (Reduction in Number of Members of Parliament) Amendment Bill for the following reasons:
2. The bill would reduce the overall size of Parliament by cutting the number of list seats without any corresponding reduction in the number of electorate seats. This would result in more overhangs and fatally undermine the proportionality which is the goal of MMP.
3. Under the current system, overhangs are the exception rather than the rule, and the usual beneficiaries are small parties. The current situation (where the Maori Party has one seat more than it is entitled to) is the first time this has happened since MMP was introduced in 1996. But if the bill passed, electorate seats would make up a far larger proportion of the House – approximately 70% as opposed to 58%. The FPP system used for electorate seats means that they are not distributed proportionately; rather, differences in vote share between parties are magnified, and the largest party gains a disproportionate share. Currently, this does not matter. A party would have to sweep almost all of the electorates in order for overall proportionality to be affected – something which has never happened in the history of party politics in New Zealand (the largest landslides – in 1905 and 1990 – saw the winning party gain just over 70% of the seats). But in a smaller House with the same number of electorates, it is far more likely that this magnifying effect would affect proportionality and result in an overhang for the largest party.
4. For example, if the 2002 election had been run under the system proposed in the bill, Labour would have gained 45 seats on 41.26% of the vote – 2 more than they would have been entitled to (the difference being due to the “wasted vote” – votes for parties which did not make the threshold). National would have gained 22 seats on 20.93% of the vote, and gained only one list seat. If the 1999 election had been run under this system, the 41 electorate seats won by Labour would have been exactly what it was entitled to, and it would have gained no list seats. Only in elections where the two major parties were very closely matched (as in 1996 and 2005) would there be a low chance of an overhang.
5. More generally, if the largest party gets 40% of the vote, it would have to win only 57% of the electorate seats before it affects proportionality. This has happened in seven of the twelve elections since 1972. While the effect will not be as great as it was under FPP (the losing party gaining a top-up from the list), this suggests that overhangs benefiting the larger party would once again become an entrenched feature of our electoral system.
6. This problem will only get worse, as the number of electorate seats will continue to grow at the expense of the list. Reducing the number of list seats so greatly will result in progressively more and more overhangs until proportionality completely breaks down (something expected to occur when the number of electorates reaches about 75% of the total).
7. In addition to providing regular overhangs for the largest party, the bill would also magnify their effect, giving their recipients proportionately more power. One extra seat counts for more in a 100-seat Parliament than in a 120-seat one. Thus they will be more of a distortion, and there would be more of an incentive for parties to deliberately seek to “game the system” to benefit from an overhang. This would reduce the legitimacy of the electoral system overall.
8. One solution would be to amend the Electoral Act to reduce the number of electorates proportionately to the overall reduction (i.e. to 58 seats). This would require reducing the number of South Island seats to 13. Quite apart from the legal difficulties (the appropriate clause of the Act, s35, is entrenched and change would therefore require a supermajority or a referendum), this would likely result in electorates which are simply too large to be practical.
9. In short, the goal of a reduction in the number of MPs cannot be achieved without fatally compromising MMP. While some would point out that a smaller House was approved by an indicative referendum in 1999, it is worth remembering that the move to a proportional system was also approved by a far more rigorous and binding referendum process in 1992 and 1993. It would be inappropriate to overturn the results of that referendum without a similarly rigorous process which ensured that the electorate was fully informed of the consequences.
10. As a final note, the increase in the size of the House under MMP has not just ensured proportionality; it has substantially reduced the power of the executive and given us better oversight by Parliament. Many commentators have noted the increased effectiveness of Select Committees under MMP, and this is no accident. More members has meant more people available to do the work of scrutinising legislation, rather than simply rubberstamping it. It has also meant more eyeballs watching the government, ensuring a higher level of accountability in general. Reducing Parliament to 100 members would return us to the pre-MMP days of an unaccountable executive lording it over a rubberstamp legislature. I do not believe this is desirable, or in fact desired by the majority of New Zealanders.
11. I do not wish to make an oral submission to the Select Committee.